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1. INTRODUCTION:
In any talk such as this, limited to an hour, I must of necessity 
generalise to quite a considerable extent. While this has the advantage 
of allowing me to sketch in broad trends and processes, it does mean that 
some of the detail which you may be specifically interested in has to be 
omitted. It also means that much of what I say about South Africans is 
true not for all individuals or groups, but only for the main groups and 
for the broad pattern of events. Individual variations cannot be dealt 
with here. Therefore, you may be interested to know the main sources I 
have relied on, and which I commend to you for further reading if you are 
interested. These are:
C. W. de Kiewiet: A Short History o f  South A frica : Social
and Economic: Oxford University Press,
Cape Town, 1941.
M. Wilson and L. Thompson: The Oxford History o f  South A frica :
Vol. 1: Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 
1969: (when Vol. II comes out it should be 
a very useful companion to this first volume).
D. H. Houghton: The South African Economy: Oxford University
Press, Cape Town, 1964.
W. H. Vatcher, Jnr.: White Laager: The Rise o f  Afrikaner
Nationalism: Pall Mall Press, London, 1965.
In addition, I can commend to you an excellent analysis of the 
recent position, particularly on the political front, with some specula­
tions about the future, prepared by a colleague of mine at the Institute 
for Social Research - Lawrence Schlemmer. This is to be published very 
shortly by the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg.
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2 . THE EARLY YEARS:
South Africa has been inhabited by yellow and black-skinned 
peoples for many centuries. These peoples were scattered across the 
country, with greater concentrations in the better rainfall areas, 
especially along the eastern seaboard. (Refer to rainfall and topo. maps). 
The black-skinned groups formed the bulk of this population, and stretched 
from about Algoa Bay northwards in a broad belt parallel to the coast, 
into Mocambique and beyond. The inland parts of Natal, parts of the pre­
sent Orange Free State and the Transvaal, as well as the present 
Republics of Lesotho and Swaziland and Botswana, were also inhabited by 
the black-skinned tribes. All these inhabitants had their own preliter­
ate non-western cultures. The economic base of their way of life was a 
semi-nomadic pastoralism, with a shifting agriculture, and some hunting.
The yellow-skinned inhabitants were of two types - the Bushmen and 
Hottentots. The Bushmen (or ’San*) whom we remember today mainly for 
their rock paintings, lived in the Cape mountains and throughout the 
mountainous areas of Southern Africa - in the Drakenstein and Cedarberg 
ranges, the Outenique, Camdeboo, Sneeuberg, Winterberg, Stormberg and 
Drakensberg mountain ranges; along the Orange river, and on to the 
plateau north of it, and in the valleys of the Vaal, Kei, Tsomo and 
Tukela rivers. The Hottentots (or 'Khoikhoi*) were nomadic herders 
found from the Swakop River on the Atlantic to the Buffalo on the Indian 
Ocean, along the coastal belt, except where the coast was barren, when 
they would be some miles inland.
It is only from 1652, with the founding of a permanent replenish­
ment station by the Dutch East India company at the Cape, that permanent- 
White settlement was introduced into South Africa. It has become very 
popular in recent years for Whites to view the development of South Africa 
as dating back to 1652, but we must remember the importance of the settle­
ment of the country by these non-Whites during the centuries preceeding 
van Riebeck’s arrival at the Cape.
The colonisation of the tip of Africa by Whites was, I suggest, 
inevitable - given the great expansion of European maritime trade with 
the east from the 17th century onwards; the half-way position of the 
tip of the continent between Europe and India; and its temperate climate 
with absence of sub-tropical or tropical diseases.
During the first 50 years of White settlement up to the end of the 
17th century, virtually all Whites were limited to the south-western tip 
of South Africa. From the 18th century onwards a steady expansion of 
White settlement took place, slowly at first, and then with increasing 
rapidity. During the 18th century the spread from the Cape was mainly
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in a broad belt eastwards along the coast, as a result of the movement of 
the Trekboere. These were Dutch (Afrikaans-speaking) semi-nomadic 
pastoralists, who included hunting as part of their way of life. Their 
way of life was a successful adaption to the country, with its unreliable 
rainfall and the limited fertility of the soils. By the latter part of 
the 18th century the Trekboere had reached as far along the coast as the 
Fish River north of Algoa Bay, and inland to Graaff-Reinet. (See map). 
Small scattered pockets of Trekboere had penetrated deeper than this, 
mainly inland. The yellow-skinned inhabitants (the Bushmen and 
Hottentots) living in the areas occupied by White settlement were per­
manently affected, and were dropping markedly in numbers. However, up 
to the 19th century black and white had had little contact with each other, 
and were still geographically separate.
3. THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
During the 19th century, the tempo and extent of White settlement 
accelerated markedly.
After the second (and final) British occupation of the Cape in 
1806, the '1820 Settlers’ were settled on the eastern frontier of the Cape 
Colony, south of the Fish River. They were mainly unemployed, British 
workers. Their settlement was undertaken by the British Government in an 
attempt to 'kill two birds with one stone' - to alleviate some of the 
unemployment in Britain after the Napoleonic Wars, and at the same time to 
provide a buffer strip between the so-called 'Kaffir Tribes' driven north 
of the Fish River, and the Cape Colony to the south. These settlers 
were mainly townspeople in background. While they were settled on agri­
cultural holdings, the majority very soon left the land for the small 
towns of the Colony, (especially Graham's Town), and reverted to being an 
urban population.
From 1836 to 1854, the Voortrekkers (Afrikaans-speaking pastoral- 
ists-cum-hunters in the tradition of the Trekboere) moved with their 
wagons northwards into the interior plateau regions, where they encoun­
tered the black-skinned peoples. They founded the rather unstable Boer 
Republics of the Orange Free State (north of the Orange River), and the 
Transvaal (between the Transvaal and the Limpopo Rivers). Some Voor­
trekkers also took their wagons over the Drakensberg Mountains into Natal 
and formed a Republic there, despite conflicts with the Zulu Kingdom.
This Republic was later annexed by the British in 1843.
So it is that by the 1860's South Africa was peopled by Blacks and 
Whites, with a few yellow-skinned people left over after the epidemics,
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conflicts with the Whites and miscegenation, had taken their toll.
Unlike the position in America, in Australia, and in New Zealand, the bulk 
of the indigenous population in South Africa - the black-skinned peoples - 
did not die out as a result of epidemics and conflicts, but survived 
alongside the new settlers. The economy of the country at that stage was 
'undeveloped'. Towns were few and small, and both Blacks and Whites, 
with the exception of the town-dwellers, were almost entirely semi-nomadic 
pastoralists. Amongst both Whites and Blacks essentially a rural sub­
sistence economy prevailed. Outside the towns, the main difference be­
tween White and non-White was not economic, but cultural. The Whites 
exhibited a form of western culture which was becoming increasingly 
isolated and static due to geographical isolation from contemporary 
western influences. Tribal preliterate cultures were characteristic of 
the Blacks.
At this stage I should mention that because of labour problems, 
slaves had been introduced into the Cape early on by the Dutch East India 
Company. First of all West-African slaves were introduced in 1658, but 
later Malay and other Eastern slaves were imported from the East Indies. 
The introduction of slaves had the unfortunate effect of fixing very 
firmly in the minds of the White population the idea that certain forms 
of manual labour - both skilled and more particularly unskilled labour - 
were suitable only for non-Whites, and that it was beneath the dignity of 
the White man to stoop to such labour.
While emancipation of the slaves at the Cape took place under 
British rule in 1834, this in no way altered the attitude of the Whites 
towards unskilled labour, which had developed over the preceeding century 
and more.
As South Africa developed, it was possible for this attitude to 
persist, for the country had large numbers of black-skinned peoples to use 
as an unskilled labour force. Consequently we do not find South Africa 
experiencing the large-scale immigration of Whites during the 19th century 
which was so typical of Canada, America and Australia. These latter 
immigration waves were largely composed of unskilled Whites - generally 
it was not the skilled classes who emigrated from Britain and Europe.
Secondly, with South Africa's geographical and cultural isolation 
from Europe, and the fact that the country was largely by-passed by waves 
of White immigration, most of the White inhabitants of South Africa during 
the 19th century persisted in the Seventeenth century view of White/non- 
White relations in terms of Master/Slave status. This view had developed 
during the early days of the Company Station at the Cape. The non-
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Whites were seen as having a social position akin to that of slaves; and 
as has happened before during human history, the superior position of the 
master and the subordinate position of the servant or slave was seen as 
having something of a divine or biblical foundation, and therefore was 
intrinsic in the nature of things. Here one is reminded very much of 
Aristotle’s famous - or should I say infamous - defence of slavery.
There was a persistence of White attitudes of superordination and sub­
ordination, with a clearcut idea on the part of the White of what is 
right and appropriate in terms of social relations and status between the 
White master and the non-White serving population. In fact, in terms of 
what the Voortrekkers themselves said, one of their reasons for their trek 
away from the Cape Colony was to try to escape from the British, with 
their new-fangled ideas on the relation and status, and rights and duties, 
of masters towards their servants, and the right of servants to take their 
masters to court. Remember, the servants were all non-White. The
Voortrekkers felt that the important and fundamental relationship between 
master and servant was being completely overthrown - and for this and 
other reasons they therefore escaped into the wilderness to preserve their 
way of life.
It is tempting to speculate on what the future history of South 
Africa would have been like, and what attempts, if any, would have been 
made to organise the White/non-White relations, if slavery had never been 
introduced into South Africa, and therefore if South Africa had also 
enjoyed the extensive waves of unskilled White immigration which other 
British colonies enjoyed during the 19th century. I leave the specula­
tions to you, only noting that some authors (e.g. Vatcher) contend that 
even today most South Africans still unconsciously see White/non-White 
relations in terms of the old concepts of master and slave. I leave it 
to you to judge during your stay whether you can find evidence of this 
attitude.
We must see clearly the position by the middle of the 19th century:
The Trekboere, and their social descendants the Voortrekkers, had success­
fully made a rural adaption to a climate of uncertain rainfall and unpre­
dictable agricultural production. Their semi-nomadic pastoral way of 
life, was a successful adaption to a stage in the country's economy 
where land was relatively cheap, and there was plenty of it. It was 
essentially the same adaption as the black-skinned peoples had already 
made. By the start of the century, the Whites (Afrikaners) moving 
northwards, and the Blacks, who were already in the country and were 
under pressure to move further southwards, both had the same economic way 
of life, despite different cultures. Both wanted extensive grazing
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lands for their cattle, and were looking for pastures new. Under such 
conditions, conflict was inevitable, and was to go on intermittently for 
a century. The Kaffir Wars (so-called) of the 19th century were not, as 
is very often depicted today, a clash between civilised Whites and a 
bunch of brutal unreliable savages. Rather they were fundamentally a 
clash of similar interests and similar economic levels - but a clash be­
tween an inferior and a superior technological culture, both cultures 
demanding more land. The Whites, with the superior technological cul­
ture, were the victors, despite the fact that their numbers were very 
much smaller. We must admit, in all honesty, that both sides in the 
clash had their treacheries and their deceits, their brutalities, as well 
as their bravery, nobleness, and occasional generosities.
Therefore, by the mid years of the century, South Africa was 
embroiled in a series of intermittent and often petty conflicts between 
White and Black over land. It is important to note that while in some 
cases the vanquished non-Whites were driven back into enclaves, often 
victor and subject settled together, the latter serving the former. This 
was especially so in the Eastern Cape. South Africa also suffered a 
series of vacillating and uncertain changes in policy by the British, who 
by this stage controlled Natal and the Cape Colony. It also witnessed 
unstable attempts by the Burgers of the Free State and the Transvaal to 
build Republics.
To Siam up, by 1867 there were Whites and non-Whites, geographically 
interspersed, often living in the same regions, both largely at a similar 
economic level and with a similar economic interest.
4 . THE DISCOVERY OF DIAMONDS AND GOLD 
AND THE CONSEQUENCES:_______________
Into this scene a dramatic change was introduced. In 1867 
diamonds were discovered in South Africa. With the introduction of the 
diamond mining industry we have, in the words of de Kiewiet, ’the intro­
duction of South Africa’s first industrial community, namely the diamond 
fields’. In 1884 the main gold-bearing reefs in South Africa on the 
Witwatersrand, were discovered. With the discovery of diamonds and gold, 
industrialisation and associated urbanisation were injected into the 
South African scene. As de Kiewiet puts it: ’In the midst of a slow- 
moving rural people there sprang up a startling modern industry*.
(p. 117). South Africa was pulled out of its geographical and cultural 
isolation, from a subsistence economy into the world economy. Big
business, capital and entrepreneural enterprise were introduced.
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Increasingly since that time there has been the development of an 
industrial economy alongside the rural subsistence economy. This urban 
industrial economy has been aided by an inflow of urban immigrants with 
urban skills (largely English-speaking immigrants), and at first it was 
they who built up the urban areas. There has been a decreasing remnant 
of the subsistence economy in the rural areas. Today, the country 
exhibits a dual economy, as Houghton has indicated. There is on the one 
hand an industrial urban economy, and on the other, a rural subsistence 
economy. The latter economy is now found almost exclusively amongst the 
Africans in their rural reserves - the Bantu homelands, which are reser­
voirs of what is left of the older tribal cultures.
Thus we can conveniently regard 1870 as a watershed in the develop­
ment of South African society. At about that time the total population 
of all races was probably somewhere about one and a quarter million people 
The Whites possibly numbered only a little over two hundred and seventy 
thousand; the Coloureds one hundred and sixty thousand; Indians more or 
less six thousand (most of them had been introduced into the canefields in 
Natal as indentured labour); and some eight hundred and forty thousand 
odd Africans. Today, a century later in 1970, South Africa probably has 
a population of well over twenty million - we will know after the census 
in May. Probably over three-and-three-quarter million are Whites; over 
two million are Coloureds; possibly six hundred thousand are Asiatics; 
and because census counts are apparently under-estimates, perhaps as many 
as twenty million - certainly over fourteen million - are Africans.
It has justly been said that the discovery of diamonds and gold 
was of far greater significance for South Africa than the Great Trek.
Yet, the discovery of such minerals is not the stuff that heroes are made 
of. So we hear much of the heroes of the Great Trek, but little of the 
men of financial stature and genius who organised the early efforts of the 
diamond and gold-mining industries into the co-ordinated financial empires 
necessary for continued success. This is because the ’Uitlander’ - the 
foreigner - (usually the Briton) was the person who developed the industry 
and he was both at that time and indeed for many years to come, decidedly 
unacceptable to the ethos and way of life of the Afrikaner who had with­
drawn to the wilderness. In a sense the Great Trek - i.e. the develop­
ment of the interior by Whines - was inevitable and therefore not of 
especial importance. If it had not been undertaken by one group of people 
it would have been undertaken sooner or later by others. By contrast, 
the introduction of an urban industrial economy into the country was of 
tremendous and indelible significance.
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Diamonds, and later gold, depended on cheap Black labour.
Remember, the Whites regarded manual labour as infra dig, so that the 
Whites were the entrepreneurs and the supervisors, while the sweaty 
manual labour was done by the Blacks. From 1870 onwards the Whites and 
the Blacks were both drawn into this industrial economy and laboured side 
by side - although on unequal levels. It has ever been thus, from that 
time onwards.
Today, the Whites and the Blacks together as collaborators have
built up an industrial economy which would not have been possible on the
basis of either the Whites or the Blacks alone. As de Kiewiet has said,
’what abundance of rain and grass was to New Zealand mutton, 
what a plenty of cheap grazing land was to Australian wool, 
what the fertile prairie acres were to Canadian wheat, cheap 
native labour was to South African mining and industrial enter­
prise. From this point of view, the real battles of the last 
quarter of the 19th century were not the native wars or the 
political instabilities of the South African scene with its 
two British colonies and its two Boer Republics, all selfishly 
squabbling for their own interests ... but the struggle between 
the old and the new, between cattle and cash, between the farmer 
and the engineer, between the ox wagon and steam, between self 
sufficiency and interdependence of modern industry and commerce’.
(de Kiewiet, pages 107 - 108). There is no doubt of course, which side 
won the struggle. The irony of it is that South Africans of different 
colours have all too often seen one another as competitors in this economy. 
Competition there has been; fear of competition there is, and unfortu­
nately will be for a long time to come; but overshadowing all this, is 
the major fact which few seem to see - the Black and the White stand 
together as collaborators, and together have made possible the present 
economy of South Africa with the existing stage of development.
5- THE CLOSING YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY; OHUARDS:
The closing years of the 19th century led to greater wrangling 
and bitterness than previously between the two Boer Republics (the Orange 
Free State and the Transvaal), and the two British colonies, (the Cape and 
Natal). The- discovery of gold and. diamonds made the position worse.
The fact that at this stage the scramble for Africa was in full swing by 
European powers did not improve matters. Germany had occupied South West 
Africa in 1883, and the Portuguese were by this time in Mocambique. 
Britain, of course, had the Cape and Natal colonies. Willy-nilly, there­
fore, South Africa was drawn into the intrigue and web of international 
politics and diplomacy. Within this context, the Anglo-Boer War started 
in 1899, ending with the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902. We need not go 
into the causes or the details of this war - it was one of the many
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quarrels which South Africa has seen during the past three centuries. 
Unfortunately, it had one major effect which must not be overlooked - 
namely the arousal of deep and long-lasting bitterness on the part of the 
Boers of the Republics of the Orange Free State and more particularly the 
Transvaal.
In some ways the British rule of South Africa after the Boer War 
led to something of importance - namely in 1909 the coming together in 
Durban of representatives of the two colonies and the two ex-Republics 
for the formation of the Union of South Africa. This may not have 
happened if the Boers had won the war.
So we come to the 20th Century: The 20th Century saw slowly at
first, and then very rapidly after the Second World War, the growth of the 
South African industry. We should note what de Kiewiet has to say 
(page 225):
’White industrial society in the 20th CEntury has preserved 
many of the habits of mind of White frontier society in the 
19th Century. Its inclination to interpret its relations with 
the Natives in terms of conflict was strong. The emphasis on 
conflict, therefore, weakened man’s ability to discern the truth 
that in a society so thoroughly dependent on Native labour, the 
Natives were not merely competitors, but the most important 
collaborators as well’.
The fact that the Africans were very important collaborators was even more 
obscured during the early years of this century by a flood of poor Whites 
and poor Blacks off the land into the towns. What was taking place was 
what we now realise takes place the world over wherever economic develop­
ment and urbanisation occur. The driving out of the subsistence economy 
drives the weaker and less successful off the land. Where do they go but 
into the towns? - and they go into the towns not as men and women with 
urban skills and training, but as a moral population who have only their 
labour, their strength of muscle and sinew, to sell. In this regard the 
poor Whites (so-called, who were Afrikaners since the moral White 
population was almost entirely Afrikaans-speaking), and the (poor) Blacks, 
were economically similar. Their cultures were different, but all they as 
rural migrants had to offer to an urban economy was the sale of their hands. 
In this the poor Blacks, as more docile and more willing to work for a 
very low wage, were potentially the superior competitors. The 'civilized 
labour policy’, so-called, (or as it is often called today, the indus­
trial colour-bar), resulted from agitation from White workers who demanded 
protection against the economic competition of their fellow workers who 
were black-skinned. The uprisings on the Reef, which culminated in the 
largest one of 1922, were essentially uprisings of the threatened poor
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White workers concerned with this issue.
The industrial colour-bar is still with us today, but because of 
its restricting effect on economic development as skilled labour becomes 
scarcer and scarcer, it is increasingly being overlooked in fact. People 
of other than White origin are more and more doing jobs reserved for 
Whites - this is often under the guise of some other job label. Economic­
ally this colour-bar is a major brake on present development. Historically 
the colour-bar is the result of both legal and spontaneous limiting 
factors. Its roots date back to the Native policy of the Republic of the 
Free State and the Transvaal, and this in turn goes back to the master/ 
slave relationship and labour pattern of the 17th and 18th Century western 
Cape. So it is that the roots of present-day issues often go deep, for 
centuries back in time.
6. AFRIKANER NATIONALISM:
Something must be said about the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, 
which has become of such major political importance in South Africa 
during the last two decades.
The rise of Afrikaner nationalism has its roots deep in the 19th 
Century and earlier. More specifically it was given coherence and 
direction by the Anglo-Boer War. I have already made brief reference to 
the bitterness, resentment, and sense of minority status aroused in the 
Afrikaner by the war. The expanding towns from 1870 onwards were largely 
English-speaking towns, because it was the English who came into the 
country as urban migrants with industrial and economic skills. The 
plight of the rural Afrikaner migrant into these towns provided further 
fuel for Afrikaner nationalism. These migrants had a common language; 
a common religion (Seventeenth Century Dutch Reformed); a common 
experience dating back to the 17th Century; a common ’minority status' in 
the face of English capital and entrepreneurs! skills; and common 
attitudes and aspirations. The increasing number of.AFrikaners in the towns 
found themselves as people without power in this new industrial urban 
economy. They did not have the skills, and they did not have the know-how, 
to gain access to the seats of power. In the eyes of the English urbanite 
their language was a degenerate form of Dutch - often referred to during 
earlier years as ’kitchen Dutch’ or ’Kaffir High Dutch’. They did not have 
an international language like English. Theirs was not an international 
culture - but one which the town-dweller saw as 'backward'. It is
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understandable thus that both the feelings of resentment and loss result­
ing from the Anglo-Boer War, and the sense of inferiority and frustration 
in this new urban environment and the feeling of being discriminated 
against, formed a powerful drive to achieve, and in the course of time 
gave coherence and solidarity to the Afrikaner's aspirations and self- 
awareness. In this the Broederbond has been a key force. It has been 
consciously shaping and directing the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and 
the achievement of Afrikaner aspiration for economic and political power. 
Through its extensions such as the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuur- 
vereeniginge - the F.A.K. - it has helped to overcome Afrikaner inferiority 
feelings.
The Broederbond, particularly through the F.A.K., has attempted to 
make the Afrikaner conscious of his ethnic identity and more especially 
develop a pride in 'ons eie’. (Vatcher, page 89). The F.A.K. has been 
responsible for the excellent use of music, drama, festivals, and monuments 
in fact the full paraphernalia of social ritual - to produce a sense of 
group identity, group coherence, group loyalty amongst the vast majority 
of Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans. The Voortrekker Monument is 
one of the F.A.K. jobs, and if you analyse the monument carefully you will 
see how it plays on certain emotions to achieve its ends. The F.A.K. 
programme has adopted and enlarged national heroes who were hard-core 
resisters to British influences. Distinguished Afrikaners who co-operated 
with the British - men of the calibre of Smuts, Botha, Hofmeyer and today 
Malherbe are being ignored as being outside the pale.
The importance for the Afrikaner of a common religion cannot be 
over-estimated. Vatcher has contended ’the D.R.C. is the backbone and 
heart of Afrikanerdom’. It is calvinistic, and more Old Testament than 
New Testament orientated, and believes in the divine right of the State. 
Vatcher further has contended that the D.R.C. has maintained a strict 17th 
Century puritanism similar to the early settlers of New England. Unlike 
New Englanders, the Afrikaners have had a long history of isolation from 
external forces, and their Calvinism has changed little in the later 19th 
Century and 20th Century. The D.R.C. is composed of three churches. The 
N.G.K. is the parent church from the Netherlands, and is the largest and 
most influential. The N.H.K. in the Transvaal broke away in 1858; and 
the G.K. (Dopper Church) in the O.F.S. with its headquarters in Potchef- 
stroom, broke away in 1859. These churches have been a rallying force 
behind Afrikaner nationalism.
The aim of Afrikaner nationalism has been quite clearly to build
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an Afrikaner people who would have South Africa as their own, and who would 
avenge the defeat inflicted by the Anglo-Boer War. In 1948 when the 
Nationalists won the election, rather to their surprise, they had to come 
into their own. Malan could say 'Today South Africa belongs to us once 
more'. (Vatcher, page 138). In 1961 with the proclamation of the 
Republic at Vereeniging, (where the Peace Treaty after the Boer War had 
been signed) the wheel of fortune had turned a full circle - the Boers had 
their Republic again, but they were in the middle of the 20th Century - 
even though some of their ideas and slogans are in spirit from the earlier 
centuries.
In saying all this I hope you will not think I am implying criticism. 
I am trying as a sociologist, to see the position without bias, and to 
describe processes. Value judgements, if you wish to make them, must be 
yours.
So it is today that Afrikaner nationalism in the shape of the 
Nationalist Party dominates the country. The splintering away of the 
H.N.P. from the National Party is nothing new. Vatcher's book published 
in 1965 before there was any clear indication that there would be a split, 
pointed out that right from last century, Afrikaner nationalism has 
exhibited a series of movements where every now and again, as the main 
wing becomes more and more moderate, the extreme right-wing splinters off.
Moderates in any age do not attract the enthusiastic support which 
the extremes of right or left do, and time and again in Afrikaner national' 
ism as the moderates get more moderate, the extreme faction gains power 
and eventually takes over. So it is that the present National Party in 
power represents a right-wing splinter group of the 1930’s, which event­
ually gained power over the moderates, who now are left in remnant-form in 
the United Party. The formation of the Herstigte Nationale Party is a 
repetition of this process.
7. OTHER NATIONALISMS - ENGLISH, COLOURED, INDIAN, AFRICAN?
There has been a triumphant wave of Afrikaner nationalism in South 
Africa. So far there has been no similar wave of English-speaking 
nationalism, nor do I believe we will see any. The English South Africans 
did not need it. They saw themselves as part of a world-wide culture;
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they were in positions of authority and command very much like the English- 
speaking in French Canada9 because they came in with technical know-how 
and urban skills; they spoke an international language, and displayed 
several brands of Western Christianity. They did not feel threatened or 
inferior, and therefore nationalism was not required. Thus, unlike the 
Afrikaner who has been to a considerable extent organised and ritualised 
into almost a chosen people, the English have by contrast remained far 
less enthusiastic about themselves, and heterogeneous in terms of their 
interests and practices.
South Africa has witnessed significant signs of the rise of non- 
White nationalism amongst groups who are in a similar position sociologi­
cally to that in which the Afrikaner was for many years. Africans,
Indians and Coloureds have, as rural uneducated migrants into an urban 
economy, lacked economic power, and felt inferior and discriminated 
against. The Coloureds have until recently seen their future as being 
with the Whites. But now that the Whites are trying to draw sharp lines 
between themselves and the Coloureds, the Coloured group is turning ir. on 
itself and may too also develop its own nationalism. The Indians and 
Africans have shown clear signs of emerging nationalism. For example, 
amongst the Africans this nationalism showed through the Pan African 
Congress, and the Poqo movements. Similarly we find some elements of the 
South African Indian Congress and the Transvaal and Natal Indian Congresses 
showed nationalistic sentiments. These groups were seen as very definite 
threats by the Whites, more particularly by the Afrikaners in power, and 
therefore they and/or their leaders have been banned. In some instances 
leaders of such organisations were imprisoned or fled the country. The 
wave of nationalism amongst these people has been for the moment at any 
rate curbed by Afrikaner nationalism.
For the time being then, African and Indian nationalism is largely 
voiceless and leaderless, but nationalism is rampant in Africa today. 
Afrikaner nationalism, with its philosophy of ’Separate Development’ may 
ultimately aid in the development of other South African nationalisms 
because after all it was by clinging to their own separate characteristics 
that Afrikaner nationalism forged ahead. By forcing the African, and 
the Indian and the Coloured, to each cling to his own way of life, the 
Whites may today be unwittingly fostering the ultimate strong growth of 
’Black' and ’Brown’ nationalisms.
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8. PRESENT PATTERNS AMD PROCESSES:
While I have been asked to talk on the historical background, the 
picture would be incomplete without a brief sketch of the major outlines 
of the contemporary scene as I , as a sociologist, see it.
Industrialisation and urbanisation have been taking place very 
rapidly in South Africa, particularly during the last quarter century.
(See Figure I, showing the rate of urban development in South Africa, 
and Tables I and II). As I have indicated, these intertwined processes 
of industrialisation and rapid urbanisation have drawn both White and 
non-White off the land for basically similar economic and sociological 
reasons. These processes have produced, and continue to produce, pro­
found social changes in the South African society. In 1904 when the 
first census in all the four provinces was taken - nearly three decades 
after the discovery of diamonds and two decades after the discovery of 
gold on the Witwatersrand - about one-quarter of the total population 
lived in urban areas. This accounted for just over half of the Whites, 
almost half of the Coloureds, just over one-third of the Asiatics, and 
only one-tenth of the Africans. By 1960 the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas had doubled to 47%. Four-fifths of the Whites and 
Asiatics, two-thirds of the Coloureds, and one-third of the Africans were 
in towns. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that the pronounced 
development of urbanisation of the Republic within the lifetime of the 
older members of the population, is one of the most important changes 
taking place in South African society. The rate of urbanisation,has 
been surprisingly steady, with a slight tendency to accelerate. In 
absolute numbers, the Africans with 4.4 millions in 1960, (and probably 
far more in 1970), living in urban areas are the largest urban population. 
The urban African population has grown faster than that of any other race.
As in other parts of the developing world, South Africa is seeing 
increasing concentrations of population in large cities. The growth of 
these cities has been very rapid. For example, after the Anglo-Boer War, 
at the first country-wide census in 1904, Johannesburg, only 20 years 
after its foundation, had 156,000 people. Today Greater Johannesburg has 
well over one million people and by the turn of the century may have two- 
and-a-half million. Pretoria, the capital of the old Boer Republic in 
the Transvaal, in 1904 had only 39,000 people of all races. In 1960 it 
had 420,000, but it has been growing so rapidly that by the year 2000 it 
could also have two-and-a-half million people. The Pretoria-Witwatersrand 
conurbation had only a little under half a million people in 1904. In 
1960 it had over two million, and by the turn of the century it is likely 
to have over five million. Durban had 70,000 people at the beginning of
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the century. Today, I estimate that Greater Durban has over a million
inhabitants, and will have over two-and-a-half million in thirty years* 
time. In 1960 there were in South Africa ten cities each with a popula­
tion of 100,000 or more, and these accounted for about a quarter of the 
total population of South Africa. I estimate that these same ten cities 
could contain a third of the South African population by the turn of the 
century.
Changes in occupation have been taking place as a result of all 
these processes. The appended Tables III and IV show an overall shift 
in the occupational structure of South Africa. The shift is the direc­
tion expected as a result of economic development. There is an increased 
movement out of manual labour into service and professional occupations - 
in other words - white collar jobs. There is an increase in the contri­
bution of non-White workers to the economy at levels above the unskilled 
or semi-skilled levels. This is despite job reservation. Houghton 
contends that the economy of South Africa had by the 1930's reached the 
take-off stage for self-sustained growth. He considers that the next 
stage in economic development - 'the drive to maturity* - commenced in 
1945 after the World War II. If Rostow's theory of economic development 
holds for this country, then the last decade of the 20th century should 
see us reach *the age of high consumption'. Britain and America are 
already at this stage.
Table IV shows that the executives of the economy are mainly the 
Whites. The Asiatics and then the Coloureds occupy intermediate posi­
tions between the White population concentrated more in the white collar 
occupations, and the Africans on the other hand concentrated in the low- 
grade jobs. What is important to notice is that despite the slow changes, 
the trend has been steadily in the direction of shifting from the lower 
job levels into high level occupations. It has been suggested that the 
South African occupational structure is about three-quarters of a century 
behind the present American position, and that it will eventually catch 
up with the present-day American pattern. Rising standards of education 
and literacy have taken place as a result of these trends, although there 
are still important racial disparities. In 1955 to 1958, 28% of the 
White school-going population were in high school, and only 9% of the 
Coloureds and Asiatics, and 7% of the Africans, were at this level.
What do these trends mean? Those processes of urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and the slotí but increasing education of the previously 
pre-literate non-White population, result in the process of modernisation 
and westernisation. Present-day South African society is seeing rapid 
and irreversible trends towards the westernisation of all peoples within
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her borders. Originally the Whites were the only western group in South 
Africa. It was not long before the Coloured population grew into a sub­
culture of western culture. However, even at the turn of this century 
virtually all the Indians and Africans in South Africa were non-western in 
orientation. Their cultural background was either Asiatic or Tribal.
Today the rate of westernisation of Indians and Africans is moving apace. 
The fact that they are involved intimately in an urban industrial economy 
cannot mean otherwise. Evidence from various surveys throughout the 
country suggests that all or nearly all of the youngest generation of 
Indians in South Africa have goals which are unmistakeably a local varia­
tion of western cultures. There is an overlay of Asiatic influences, 
but as one writer has pointed out (van den Berghe in his book 'Caneville') 
this relates more to cultural inessentials than essentials. As far as 
Africans are concerned, we appear to be dealing with a continuum ranging 
from the most rural type of person who is still tribally oriented, and 
sometimes encapsulated within the urban setting, through all intermediate 
stages to the urbanite who has grown up in the city and whose reference 
group is the Whites, and who aspires consciously and deliberately to the 
full acquisition of the western culture. In between there also appear 
some Africans in a kind of cultural 'no-man's land', who have no clear 
reference group at all.
I believe that one can scarcely over-emphasise this process of 
urbanisation and concommitant westernisation of South African peoples, 
nor do I believe that the full importance of all of South Africa's peoples 
being involved in a common economy is adequately realised at the present 
time. We have the Bantu homelands which pose a problem of the undeveloped 
subsistence economy in our midst. Political considerations apart, these 
areas have to be developed and the problem is intricate and involved - I 
could say a lot about that during question time if you are interested. But 
I believe that in the long run a western urban economy will oust the sub­
sistence economy, and that the present trend will continue whereby all 
South Africans are increasingly being integrated into what will ultimately 
be a single and not a dual economy.
What does this mean for the future? I am going to make a few 
comments, and leave the speculation to you. South Africa has a long 
history of discrimination on economic and social lines which coincides 
with colour. I have suggested that in terms of White attitudes this goes 
back both to the discrimination pattern associated with the master/slave 
relationship, and also to what has been called by MacCrone, the frontier 
psychology of the Trekboer. This is the psychology of a small White group 
moving into an interior which they see themselves as pioneering, who are in 
competition, and thus conflict, for land with a numerically very much
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larger Black population. Under such circumstances, fearing extinction, 
the Whites developed a basic fear of the non-White which could only be 
allayed by the Whites dominating the situation. Thus we have both the 
imprint of the master/slave relationship which sees non-Whites as being 
appropriate to a subordinate position, and also the frontier psychology 
with its fear of the ’swart gevaar’. At the same time today we are 
seeing reverse trends in operation - the increasing demand for the reali­
sation that all peoples of South Africa have a right to status and dignity 
which is not associated with subordinate-superordinate structures, and 
that each people have their own values and their own intrinsic value.
At present, these trends seem less powerful than the former ones, but at 
the heart of the position we still have a structure of economic and social 
discrimination. It has been suggested by some social scientists that 
this discrimination has been more recently rationalised by the doctrine of 
apartheid and separate development. If so, this would be ideologically 
rationalising a process going right back to the very early days of White 
settlement in the country. Are patterns with as deep roots as this 
easily changed?
To sum up the present position and conclude: urbanisation with
the typical pattern whereby urban values and urban systems increasingly 
spread through the country as a whole, and the economic integration of all 
of South Africa increasingly into a common economy - are facts of 
tremendous importance. Certainly we cannot turn the clock back. We are 
where we are as a result of various forces, and I believe the processes 
of urbanisation and industrialisation are key ones which will more and 
more in the future stamp South Africans in a common mould of urban indus­
trial man. What do you think this will mean for South Africa and its 
complex problems?... And there, I leave it to you - it is up to you, 
during your tour of South Africa, to form your own impressions and ulti­
mately to draw your own conclusions.
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